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Abstract:  In this paper, we analyze infinite discrete-time games between hydraulic and thermal power 
operators in the wholesale electricity market. Two types of games are considered: Cournot closed-loop game 
and Stackelberg closed-loop game. We consider a deregulated electrical industry where certain demand is 
satisfied by hydraulic and thermal technologies. The hydraulic operator decides the production in each season 
of each period that maximizes the sum of expected profit from power generation with respect to the stochastic 
dynamic constraint on the water stored in the dam, the environmental constraint and the non-negative output 
constraint. In contrast, the thermal plant is operated with quadratic cost function, with respect to the capacity 
production constraint and the non negativity output constraint. This paper is devoted to the numerical 
computations of equilibrium strategies and value function in each kind of games. We show that under imperfect 
competition, the hydraulic operator has a strategic storage of water in the peak season.  Then, we quantify the 
strategic inter annual and intra annual water transfer in the both games and we compare the numerical results. 
Under Cournot closed-loop game, we show that the traditional principle of least-cost operation is inverted at the 
binding capacity constraint of thermal operator. Finally, under Stackelberg closed-loop game, we show that 
thermal operator can restrict the hydraulic output without compensation. The technical complementarities and 
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DYNAMIC GAMES IN THE WHOLESALE  
ELECTRICITY MARKET 
1-INTRODUCTION 
    In the last decades, the electricity industry set out the very important structural reform by 
inserting a competition in generation of high voltage. The transmission and distribution of 
electricity have been considered by most economists as "natural monopoly". These changes 
have split the single state owned firm into several private owned firms that compete in a 
single market: the wholesale electricity market. The economic analysis has been turned 
toward some problems like as congestion of transmission electric power network, 
concentration measures, horizontal market power, electricity spot market, bilateral 
transaction, nodal pricing in a simple and a complex network, etc; and which has been made 
in a static framework compatible with thermal power generation system. Thus, there are few 
analyses concerning the restructuring of the electricity industry with heterogeneous 
technologies. This paper takes part in the new research field concerning the mixed 
hydrothermal system operating problems under deregulated industry. The objectives of the 
paper are also to compute numerical equilibrium strategies in two kinds of games and to find 
the conditions under which the imperfect competition breeds a distortion to traditional least-
cost rule used in the mixed system operating. 
    In several countries, the liberalization process had led to different asymmetric duopoly. The 
first asymmetric case concerned the British electricity supply industry which has been 
transferred to two successors companies: National power and Gen power. In this case, Green 
and Newbery (1992) have shown that "... in an asymmetric case, less output would be sold at 
higher price, and industry operating costs will be further raised for any level of output since 
the stations will no longer operate in "merit order". The second asymmetric case is spreading 
across countries owned with significant hydraulic resources like as Norway, New Zealand, 
Western United States, etc. In the economic literature, there are few studies on the strategic 
behavior of hydraulic and thermal operators after the reform of the electricity industry. In the 
New Zealand case, Scott T. J and E. G. Read (1996) have developed a dual dynamic 
programming approach in order to characterize an optimal hydraulic schedule for a strategic 
  1firm that controls all the storage hydro capacity in a market with other Cournot producer that 
controls the thermal generation. They show that «... there is relatively little loss in 
coordination efficiency if, but only if, there is a high level of contracting and / or a high 
effective elasticity". The same problem has been analyzed in J. Bushnell (1998) model which 
developed a sub-game perfect equilibrium of a multi-period Cournot game between strategic 
producer who controls both hydro and thermal technologies. In the latter, the author has 
shown that hydraulic releases are directly done in contradictory to the principle of least-cost 
production since this decision appears as profitable for certain firms. Also, C. Crampes and 
M. Moreaux (2000) have analyzed the strategic behavior of thermal and hydraulic operators 
in closed-loop game and open-loop game with two periods. The authors have shown how the 
presence of the hydroelectric station changes the optimal as well as the market equilibrium 
outputs of the thermal station. They found that the thermal plant facing hydro plants has to be 
managed as if it were dynamically connected. The interrelation between heterogeneous 
technologies can imply other results. Indeed, the technological complementation may incite, 
under some conditions, operators to behave strategically in the electricity market and in the 
inverse to the traditional "merit order" operation. 
    None of theses models take into account the uncertainty in hydraulic resource evolution. 
The objective of this paper is to develop a multi-periods game between thermal and hydraulic 
operators in an uncertain framework. We based our analyses on the C. Crampes and M. 
Moreaux model in order to develop a more realistic asymmetric case. Indeed, the main 
characteristic of the thermal plants is the possibility to supply certain but an expensive output. 
Regarding hydraulic plant, its output is linked to a sub-renewal resource with intrinsic 
uncertain profile. Before the inflows realization, hydraulic power is provisory an exhaustible 
resource and any additional release reduces the residual water quantity stored in the dam. But, 
once the inflows are realized, any quantity of water devoted for power generation can be 
totally or partially renewed by the natural process. We think that this kind of uncertainty and 
the technical complementation may be in favor of strategic behavior particularly in higher 
priced peak market. Consequently, this may distort the traditional "merit order" rule and 
which is against the target of the structural change in the electricity industry. 
    The rest of the paper proceeds as follow. In the section 2, we present the model. Then, in 
section 3, we deal with a Cournot closed-loop game between thermal and hydroelectric 
operators in the wholesale electricity market. Section 4 is devoted to the numerical analysis of 
Stackelberg closed-loop game between the two operators. Next, we compare the numerical 
results of imperfect competition. We conclude in section 5. 
  2 
THE MODEL 
 
    Consider a multi-periods model where electric power is generated by two technologies: 
thermal technology (T) and hydraulic technology (H). The total output is used to satisfy a 
known demand. Since electric power demand is characterized by fluctuation, then we divide 
time into infinite years indexed by 0,1,... t = ; and the year is divided into two seasons 
( { } , j hl = , the peak season ( ) and the off-peak season ( ). Let   be the inverse 
demand function in the season
h l ( jj t Pq)
j . It is assumed to be a linear demand 
function: ()
H T





 is the electricity demand satisfied by the 
hydroelectric technology,   is the electricity demand satisfied by the thermal technology 
and   is a positive constant representing the demand characteristic in each season. From year 
to year, we take the assumption of the stationary of electrical demand function. Since in each 
season the output of two plants is homogenous then total electric power generation is written 





jt q  : for a period t and 
a season j , 
H T
jt jt jt qqq =+ . 
    The hydraulic plant uses as input a sub-renewable resource stored in a dam. In every yeart, 
the total output must satisfy the following technical constraint: 11
hH lH
tt tt t SS qqf + + =− − + . We 
denote by   the current stock and  t S 1 t f +  the inflow assumed to be observed at the end of the 
period . To simplify we do not consider the technical limit in terms of water turbine t 1and we 
assume that hydraulic generation is costless. The inflows of period t are denoted by a random 
variable  1 t f +  with density probability function  ( ) 1 t f φ + ′  defined on 0,F ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ , where F  is the 
maximum inflow. In addition, we assume that inflows are represented by a random and a 
stationary process, { } 1 0,1,2,... t t f + =  defined on 0,F ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ . In addition, the hydroelectric operator must 
satisfy an environmental constraint: his storage at the end period must be at a known level . 
Where   is the level at which if it is not respected, the producer must pay a cost assumed to 
* S
* S
                                                 
1 Bernard J. T. and J. Chatel (1984) are analyzed operating and investment problem in a mixed hydrothermal 
system with technical limit in terms of water turbine. 





t SS + −− ) . This assumption is compatible also with a mobile dam2 and a 
fixed dam. First, if the dam is mobile, then   represents the maximum capacity of the fixed 
part which to simplify is confounded with maximum alert level. Consequently, any current 
stock   beyond the level   represents the supplementary water resource stored by closing 
the gates in order to avoid flood. Second, if the dam is a fixed one, then the penalty cost paid 
by producer is due to bad release policy not compatible with flooding period. This case is 
observed in July1996 in Kénogami dam located in sanguinary region in Quebec. During this 
period, the planner observed an abundant in flows in three days which has affected the water 
level. The water level attends 166,08 m which exceeds the maximum capacity of the dam 
equals to 165,67 m. Since the planner does not adopt a release policy compatible with this 
flooding period, then this over taking of maximal capacity cause a flood with enormous 
damages. Consequently, the quadratic form penalty cost compatible with the area flooded 
around the dam. Now, if the expected storage at the end of a period t is less then the level , 






j     The  technical  characteristics  of the thermal plant are the following. At each season   
during the periodt, the generation of   units of energy from thermal plant needs a total cost 









For all   0,
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jt j jt Cq c q =
T . Where  is a positive 
constant for all season 
j c
{ } j , hl ∈  and 
T
q is a known and a positive constant representing the 
installed capacity. By this hypothesis we neglect the depreciation problem linked to thermal 
plant operating. 
    We consider a wholesale electricity market with duopolistic structure. We assume that each 
operator controls one process. The new industrial structure is represented as following: 
                                                 






















Fig 1: The new structure of electricity industry. 
COURNOT CLOSED-LOOP GAME 
    In this section, we assume that the two operators compete in Cournot closed-loop game in 
the electricity market.  
    The thermal operator chooses the output in the peak and off-peak season of every period 
that maximizes his profit and where the hydroelectric operator output
H
jt q , for { } , j lh ∈  is 
taken as given. The thermal operator solves the following problem: 





TH T T TH T T
hh t h th t hh t ll t l t l t ll t
qq
P q qq C q P q qqC q +− + +−     (1) 
 With respect to the capacity constraint and the non negativity constraint: 
0
T T
jt qq ≤≤   , for all  { } , j hl ∈   and all  0,1,... t =                      (2) 
 The thermal operator problem is a static one. The first order conditions are: 
() () () 0
jj HT T HT T TT
jt jt jt j jt jt jt jt jt TT
jt jt
Pd C




+++ − − + =
∂
     (3) 
( ) 0
T TT
jt jt qq μ −=   ,   0
TT
jt jt q θ =                              (4) 
0
T
jt μ ≥   ,    ,          (5)  0
T





jt μ  and 
T
jt θ  are the multipliers associated respectively to the capacity constraint and 
the non-negativity constraint. 
  5 
    The first order conditions give the reaction function of the thermal operator in each season 
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    Let  (
TH
jt jt ) R q  be the reaction function of thermal operator in season  j  of periodt. Given the 
assumption on the inverse demand function and the cost function, then the reaction function is 















    The hydraulic operator maximizes the sum of expected profit from power generation under 
the stochastic dynamic constraint on the water stored in the dam, the environmental constraint 
and the non-negativity output constraint. The hydraulic operator solves the following 
problem, where ,  are taken as given, for all t S
T
jt q { } , j hl ∈ : 
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With respect to the dynamic constraint: 
11
hH lH
tt tt t SS qqf ++ =− − + ,   for all  0,1,... t =  
0 S is given. 
 The closed-loop strategy of hydraulic operator satisfies the Bellman equation: 
()
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⎧ ⎫ =+ + + + − − ⎨ ⎬
⎩⎭ ∑  
Where   is the mean operator conditional to the information at period t which includes  
and   is the current value function associated to the stochastic dynamic program. It is 
assumed to be quadratic with unknown coefficients   and











tt JS b S BS =− t
                                                
 
In the stochastic dynamic programming terminology, this solution is called the closed-loop 
strategy. Under the above hypothesis, the equilibrium strategy exists and it is unique3. 
 
3  See Blume L. Easley D. and M. O'Harra (1982). 
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    The first order condition in the season  j at period   is:  t
()() 1
j HT H HT c
jt jt jt j jt jt t H
jt
P
























tt t t VE JE SS + ′ =−− 1 +  represents the net marginal value of the hydraulic 
resources in stock under the decentralized industry. Since  is a concave function then 
c J 1
c
t V +  is 
an increasing function in   and a decreasing function in  4 jH
t q t S . We denote  jt η  the demand 
elasticity in season  j  of periodt. We assume that  jt η  is negative and ht lt η η < . 
    The combination of the two first order conditions implies 
( )




jt jt t j t cc c c





=− + − +
++ + +
 
 For all   and jj ′ ≠ () { } { } ,, , j jh l h l ′ ∈×; where  f  represents the inflows mean. 
    This equation gives the hydroelectric output in the peak season as a function of the thermal 
operator output in the same season, the current state of the hydraulic storage and the water 
release in the off-peak season at the period .  t
    The  resolution  of  Bellman  equation  by undetermined coefficient method gives the 
equilibrium strategy of each player in periodt 5. The results are presented in the following 
proposition. The resolution of this equations system determines the hydraulic operator 
strategy in each season as a function of the current stock: ( )( ) ( )
** * ,
Hc Hc Hc
tt h t t l t t qS qS qS ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ . 
Next, we replace this strategy in the reaction function of thermal operator; we find that this 
latter is written as a function of the current stock of hydraulic operator ( )
Tc Hc
jt jt jt t qR q S ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ . 
The equilibrium strategy of thermal operator in the period t is written 
as: .  () () ()
** * ,
Tc Tc Tc
tt h t t l t t qS qS qS ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦
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Proposition 1 
    In a closed-loop game, the thermal and the hydroelectric operators output in the peak 
season and in the off-peak season is given by the following equations: 
() ()( ) ( )
*
* 48 3 1 01 2 5 1 25 1




c B aB a B f S B
qS
BB
b ⎡ ⎤ +− + − + − − + ⎣ ⎦ =+
++
 
() () ( ) ( )
*
* 13 8 2 1 5 1 51




c B aB a B f S B
qS
BB
b ⎡ ⎤ ++ + + + − − + ⎣ ⎦ =− +
++
 
() () ( ) ( )
*
* 21 4 5 1 21 2 7 1 27 1




c B aB a B f S B
qS
BB
b ⎡ ⎤ +− + − + − − + ⎣ ⎦ =+
++
 
() () ( ) ( )
*
* 23 14 4 1 9 1 91




c B aB a B f S B
qS
BB




c B =  and 
4* 2.96 10 1.29 0.37
c
ht lt bf S a
− =× − − −a  
    We remark that both thermal operator strategy and hydraulic operator strategy depend on 
current stock , on the inflows mean t S f , on the storage level   and on the electric demand in 
the peak season and off-peak season. The comparative static in the regulated industry ( ) 
* S
m
6and the Cournot competition case ( ) is given by the following table:  c
t   Systems  * H
ht q  
* T
ht q  
* H
lt q  
* T
lt q  
c  0,374 -0,075 0,405  -0,134   
t S   m  0,322 -0,08    0,48  -0,24 
c 0,118  0,169 -0,349  0,115   
ht a   m 0,6  0,1  -0,165    0,3 
c -0,195    0,038  0,187  0,269   
lt a   m -0,11  0,22  0,4  0,3 
c -1,9￿10￿³  -0,03  -0,4￿10￿³  -3,05.10￿￿   
f   m 0,4  -0,1  0,6  -0,3 
c -1,098  0,221  -1,193  0,397   
* S   m -0,32  0,08  -0,48  0,24 
 
Table 3: Comparative static in the  Cournot competition case. 
                                                                                                                                                          
5 See Basar T. and Olsder G. J (1995). 
6 See Dakhlaoui A. and M. Moreaux (2004). 
  8    From this table, we remark that any increase in water resource encourages the hydraulic 
operator to make an intra-annual transfer from peak season to off-peak season. We compare 
the Cournot solution with the first best solution; we conclude that the intra-annual transfer 
sense is maintained also with the structural change in the electricity industry. There is a 
change only in the volume of transfer. Indeed, the intra-annual transfer is appraised at 
0,158  under the regulated industry and it is appraised only at 0,031  under Cournot 
competition. This show that, for a given period, the use of supplementary resource in the peak 
season under deregulated system is greater than those under regulated system. Thus, the 
storage effect (
t S Δ t S Δ
H
tt SE S q =Δ −Δ t )7 of competition solution is greater than the storage effect of 
the first best solution8. In addition, the intra-annual transfer affects the thermal operator 
strategy. Indeed, this latter cannot decrease his output only with a quantity equals to 0,075 t S Δ  
units in the peak season and with a quantity equal to 0,134 t S Δ  units in the off-peak season. 
Consequently, the substitution of expensive technology output with costless. Technology 
output under competition is less than the substitution under regulated system9. Regarding the 
satisfaction of any increase in the peak demand, both the thermal operator and the hydraulic 
operator increase their output in different proportions. The hydraulic producer prefers to make 
an intra-annual transfer from off-peak season to peak season. Indeed, the release increase in 
the peak season and it is appraised at 0,118 ht a Δ  units, but the release decrease in the off-peak 
season is appraised at 0,349  units. For the thermal operator, he increases the output in 
both seasons in order to let possible the storage of water resource in the off-peak season. We 
remark that the hydraulic operator does not use all the intra-annual transfer to satisfy the 
supplementary demand because the storage in the off-peak season is greater than the release 
in the peak season. Thus, there is storage of water resource appraised at 0,231  units that 
will be used for the satisfaction of electricity demand for the following periods. 
ht a Δ
ht a Δ
                                                 
7 Storage effect is defined as the interaction between the increase in inter annual transfers comes from preceding 
periods ( ) and the increase in the release from the stock at the end of periodt .  t S Δ
8 If the renewable effect is nil, then   and 0.221
c
t SE S =Δ 0.198
m
t SE S = Δ . 
9 The substitution of thermal output by hydraulic output is equals to 0,299 t S Δ  under competition and it is equal 
to 0,322  under regulated industry.  t S Δ
 
  9    The numerical approximation lets possible both the quantification of water transfer and the 
substitution between technologies. We conclude the structural reform in the electricity 
peak-season. Implicitly, we consider a large capacity constraint which is impossible to be 
bound in the off-peak season. In this case, the thermal operator cannot produce only
industry not only changes solution greatness, but also it saves the least cost operating 
principle if the thermal operator does not hurt a binding capacity constraint problem.  
    Now, we assume that the thermal operator has a binding capacity constraint problem in the 
T
hydraulic operator must satisfy the residual demand:
q . The 
T
ht qq − , where  ht q  is the total demand in 
the peak-season of period t. The hydraulic operator can choose between Cournot equilibrium 
output or to exert a market power on the residual demand with an output   T
ht q  less than
Tc
ht q . 
The strategic behavior of hydraulic operator leads to an increase in energy price in the peak-
season. This behavior affects the strategy of two players in the off-peak season. Thus, the 
output decreasing is in favor of intra-annual transfer from peak season to off-peak season. 
Besides the transfer under constrained Cournot competition is greater than the transfer under 
unconstrained Cournot competition, it is not used to increase the off-peak season supply and 
consequently to substitute the thermal energy. The hydraulic operator tends to storage much 
water resource in order to push the thermal operator to produce more than the Cournot 
equilibrium output. This strategic behavior is, then, in favor of an important storage effect. 
This hydraulic storage is done in a strategic motivation in the peak-season of following 
periods. At the binding capacity constraint, the peak-season thermal plant operating is greater 
than those of hydraulic plant even with abundant water resource. Consequently, we can 
conclude that the binding capacity constraint is among the conditions under which the 
operating 
k season. Then, the hydroelectric 
operator decides its output with respect to the current stock of water, the stochastic futur 
storage in the dam and the output of the thermal operator. 
system rule is inverted in a deregulated industry. 
STACKELBERG CLOSED-LOOP GAME 
 
    We analyze an other kind of quantity game in the wholesale electricity market such as the 
Stackelberg game between hydroelectric and thermal operator. We assume that the thermal 
operator constitute a dominant firm in the market. At each period the thermal operator first 
decides its production also in the peak and the off-pea
  10        Given  the  thermal  strategy,  the  hydroelectric player decides the energy output that 
maximizes the expected sum of its annual profit with respect to the stochastic dynamic of the 
water stock stored in the dam. 
    The value function  , evaluated at the period t must satisfy the Bellman equation:  ()
s
tt JS









sT H H T H H s
t t h ht ht ht l lt lt lt t t t t
qq t






⎧ ⎫ =+ + + + − − ⎨ ⎬
⎩⎭ ∑  
Where   is the mean operator conditional to the information at period t which include .   () t E ⋅ t S
At each season  j  of the period , the hydroelectric operator decides the quantity produced 
given the thermal operator strategy and the current stock of water. The reaction functions of 
the hydroelectric operator are solutions of theses equations: 
t
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=      
Theses equations give the peak season hydroelectric production as a function of the water 
release at the off-peak season, the thermal output at the peak season and the stock of water 
available at the period t. The same resolution at the of-peak season: 
( ) ,,
HH T T
ht ht lt ht t qQ q q S =  
( ) ,,
HH T T
lt lt lt ht t qQ q q S =  
     The thermal profit of season  j  at the period t is equals to the total receipt of energy 
purchase comes from thermal plant mines the total cost of production: 
() ( ) ( ) ,
TH T H TT T
jt jt jt j jt jt jt j jt qq P q qq Cq π =+−  
        Given the hydroelectric operator strategy at current period, 
and , the thermal operator decides to supply energy 
that maximizes the profit with respect to the capacity constraint and the non-negativity output 
constraint. The reaction function of the thermal operator is a solution this problem: 
() ,,
HH T T
ht ht lt ht t qQ q q S = ( ,,
HH T T
lt lt lt ht t qQ q q S = )




H TT T H TT T
t h ht ht ht h ht l lt lt lt l lt
qq
Max P q q q C q P q q q C q π =+− ++−  
With respect to the constraints: 
  11( ) ,,
HH T T
ht ht lt ht t qQ q q S =  
( ) ,,
HH T T
lt lt lt ht t qQ q q S =  
 
    The thermal operator problem is a static one. The Lagrange function is written as: 





s HT T TT T T s T HT T TT T T s T
h ht lt ht t ht ht h ht ht ht l lt lt ht t lt lt l lt lt lt
qq




jt θ is the multiplicator of non negativity output constraint of the thermal plant in 
period  j  at the periodt, for all  { } , j hl ∈ .To simplify, we neglect the turbinate capacity of 
thermal plant. 
        The reaction function of the thermal operator is characterized by the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions. For the season  { } , j hl ∈ at periodt: 
0
H
jj t j TT h
jt j ht TT HT
jt jt jt jt
PQ P dC
qP
qq q d q
θ
∂∂ ∂




jt jt q θ = ,   and .  0
T
jt q ≥ 0
T
jt θ ≥
If the multiplicator of non-negativity output constraint is nil, the thermal operator strategy is a 
solution of following system:
H
jj t j T h
jt j TT T H
jt jt jt jt
PQ P dC
qP




       
The resolution of the equations system gives the thermal operator strategy at the two seasons 
as a function of the current water stock of the thermal operator: , for all  ()
Ts T
jt jt t qQ S =
{ } , j hl ∈ . 
    We replace the thermal operator strategy at the first order conditions of the hydroelectric 
operator. In the season  j at the period t : 





j TH H TH t
jt t jt jt j jt t jt t t t t H
jt t
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The resolution of theses equations system gives the hydroelectric operator strategy at the 
equilibrium as a function of the current water stock: ( )
Hs H
jt jt t qQ S = .       
We replace this strategy in the Bellman equation; we can find the value function associated to 
the hydroelectric operator in the Stackelberg competition with the thermal operator: 
  12() () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ()
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JS P qS qSqS P qS qSqS
EJS q S q S f S q S q S f ++
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NUMERICAL APPROXIMATION OF EQUILIBRIUM: LINEAR-QUADRATIC CASE 
 
        We consider a linear inverse demand function at the electricity market: 
()
H TH
j jt jt j jt jt Pq q a q q += − −




 the value function associated to the hydroelectric 
operator problem under Stackelberg competition between the two producers. We assume that 






t b S B S =− JS , where 
s b  and 
s B  are unknown 
coefficients. 
The hydroelectric operator strategy at the two seasons verifies the Bellman equation: 
()() () () { }
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Given , the first order conditions are given by the following equations:  ()
s
tt JS
()() () () { }
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The combination of the two latter equations gives the hydroelectric operator output at the 
peak season as a function of the thermal operator output at the peak and the off-peak season: 
12 30
H HT H HT h H
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. 
    For the hydroelectric output at the off-peak season:  
  1312 30
H HT H HT l H
lt lt t ht qL q L S L qL =+ ++  
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 . 
    The thermal operator decides the output given the hydroelectric operator strategy. The 
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The first order conditions give the thermal operator output as a function also of his production 
in the other season and the current water stock: 12
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 .       
The combination of the two equations implies the thermal operator output strategy as a 
function of the current water stock of the hydroelectric operator. The same thing for the 
hydroelectric operator. 
Proposition 2 
    The Stackelberg closed-loop game equilibrium is given by the following equations: 
* 0.087 0.1708 0.077 0.057 0.1078
T
ht t h l qS a a S =− + + + − f  
* 0.3313 0.422 0.206 0.2169 0.41
H
ht t h l qS a a S =− − −+ f  
* 0.087 0.1104 0.325 0.1 0.1164
T
lt t h l qS a a S =− + + + − f  
* 0.364 0.1246 0.1694 0.2383 0.4504
H
lt t h l qSaaS =− + − + f  
    The value function associated to the hydro electrical operator is: 
()
2* 0.435 0.2279 0.4053 0.2377 0.4491
s
tt h l JS a a S =− + + + − t f S  
  14 The comparative static in the regulated and unregulated industry is given by the following 
table 
t   Systems  * H
ht q  
* T
ht q  
* H
lt q  
* T
lt q  
s  0,331 -0,087 0,364  -0,087   
t S   m  0,322 -0,08    0,48  -0,24 
s -0,422  0,170  -0,124  0,110   
ht a   m 0,6  0,1  -0,165    0,3 
s -0,206    0,077  0,169  0,325   
lt a   m -0,11  0,22  0,4  0,3 
s 0,410 -0,107 0,450  -0,116   
f   m 0,4  -0,1  0,6  -0,3 
s -0,216  0,057  -0,238  0,1   
* S   m -0,32  0,08  -0,48  0,24 
 
Table 2: The static comparative in a Stackelberg closed-loop game 
 
FORCED STORAGE 
We assume that the two producers observe a demand increase at the peak season equals to 
. At the sequential asymmetric game, the supplementary demand energy is satisfied only 
by the T plant. Indeed, the H operator output at the peak season decreases by the 
quantity .  The conservation of the water resources is not entirely compensated by 
an increase in the production of the power station. The T operator increase production by a 
quantity equal to   units of energy. The position of the T operator on the market 
reduces the production of the H operator especially at the season   without compensation. 
This little increase in the production allows to the T operator profit coming from the high 
price of energy at the season h . The T operator adopts the same strategy at the season   but 
in the different sizes. Thus, the increase in the T production is evaluated at 
h a Δ
0,4224 h a −Δ
0,1708 h a Δ
h
l
0,1104 h a Δ  
whereas the increase in the H production achieve only 0,1246 h a − Δ . This kind of game does 
not make it possible to the H operator to intervene by his free technology to satisfy the 
increase in demand at seasonh. On the other hand, the T operator obliges the H operator to 
preserve his resources in order to exert a power of market on this additional demand. In this 
case, the inter annual transfer, the intra-annual transfer and the technological 
  15complementarities do not make it possible to mitigate the perverse effects of the position of 
the T operator. 
FORCED CYCLIC HYDROELECTRIC SEEDLING  
 
    With the difference of the preceding section, an increase in the demand at the season  of a 
quantity equal to   requires the recourse, in different proportions, at the same time with the 
T station and the H power station. The production of the T operator increases by a quantity 
equals to    whereas that of the H operator increases only by 0  units. To 
satisfy this additional request, one calls more upon the T station that with the H station. The 
increase in H operator output comes from the intra-annual transfer from the h season to the l 
season. The H operator preserves 
l
l a Δ
l a Δ 0,3257 ,1694 l a Δ
0,206 l a Δ  units of water at the season  and it uses only a 
quantity equal to   to satisfy the additional demand of the seasonl. The position of 
the T operator on the market prevents the H operator from using all or a higher part of its 
transfer to the seasonl. It obliges the H operator to preserve 
h
l a
0,1694 l a Δ
0,0366Δ  units of water to 
satisfy any increase in demand at the season l of the following periods and not to satisfy the 
increase in demand in the season   . The T operator increases his production at the season   




    In this paper, we have analyzed the effect of imperfect competition one the optimal order in 
operating the mixed hydrothermal system. This operating is based one the substitution of 
costly technology output by the costless technology output. This substitution is only possible 
with the potential energy transfers. In contrast, the Cournot competition in power generation 
favored the strategic storage of water resource. Consequently, this behavior of hydraulic 
operator lets the additional uses of thermal technology greater then that under regulated 
industry. We show that the least cost operating rule is preserved also with this hydraulic 
operator in the non-constraint model; but it is inverted at the binding capacity constraint of the 
thermal operator. Under Stackelberg competition, we have shown that the thermal operator 
position on the market can increase the conservation of hydraulic resources in the two 
seasons.  In this type of competition, the inter annual transfers and the intra annual transfers 
do not have any role. One solution of this problem is to set, by a contract, the minimal peak 
  16season output supplied by both operators on the market. To extend this paper, we proposes to 
analyze the effect of technical complementation and congestion of transmission network one 
the behavior of operators in the market. Future For research we proposes to study the effect of 
imperfect competition of each operator endowed by two heterogeneous technologies.  
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